Is Putin in trouble? Former senior Russian official's open letter: elites are cutting ties, GDP halved, approval ratings falling, countdown to system collapse

A former Kremlin senior official has anonymously written an op-ed in The Economist, revealing that the Russian elite class is subtly distancing itself from Putin. Over the past three years, this government is estimated to have confiscated approximately $60 billion in private assets; with inflation running hot, GDP forecasts cut in half, and Putin's approval rating falling from over 80% before the war to 65.6%, the situation is shifting. (Background: Russia plans to "comprehensively ban gasoline exports" starting 4/1! To prevent domestic oil prices from spiraling out of control, may push up global inflation) (Context: Massive protests escalate in Iran: thousands arrested, internet cut off overnight, exiled prince calls for uprising... is a heavy crackdown imminent?) The op-ed points out that Moscow government officials, regional governors, and business figures, when describing Putin's actions, no longer use "we," but have switched to calling him "he." This barely noticeable grammatical shift is a rare centrifugal signal from the core of Russian power in many years. A former Kremlin senior official recently wrote anonymously to The Economist: "Ironically, Putin launched this war to consolidate his regime and preserve the system he built. But since the conflict began, Russians have for the first time started to imagine a future without him." One direct cause of elite defection is the comprehensive collapse of property protection mechanisms. This former official estimates that over the past three years, the Kremlin government has confiscated approximately $60 billion (about NT$1.9 trillion) in assets from private businessmen, some through direct nationalization, others transferred to Putin's close associates. The op-ed states: "The elite class has not suddenly developed a craving for rule of law or democracy. But even those loyal to the regime crave rules and institutions that can resolve disputes fairly." In the past, Russian tycoons could rely on Western legal systems to protect their overseas wealth; but with the dual blockade of exit bans and Western sanctions, this escape route has been completely closed. Battlefield attrition is also eroding the Russian economy in quantifiable ways. The Russian Central Bank forecasts inflation in 2026 will reach 5.0%–5.5%, and was once forced to raise the benchmark interest rate to a high of 21%. The debt burden on businesses and borrowers has thus sharply worsened, default cases have risen, and financial crisis warnings have appeared one after another. Growth prospects are equally bleak. Deputy Prime Minister Novak has significantly revised down the 2026 GDP growth forecast from 1.3% to 0.4%, while the budget deficit for the first two months of 2026 has accumulated to 5.99 trillion rubles. Ukrainian military strikes have also caused Russia to lose at least 40% of its refining capacity, with energy revenues suffering structural blows. To further control asset outflows, Putin has banned the export of gold bars exceeding 100 grams starting May 1, 2026. Under the heavy pressure of high interest rates and inflation, the shift in public sentiment has been reflected in official figures: surveys from Russia's state-run polling agency show Putin's approval rating has fallen from over 80% before the war to 65.6%; other reports indicate public trust in him has slipped to 29.5%. Meanwhile, Putin himself is accelerating his withdrawal from public view. According to sources from the UK's Financial Times, Putin now spends 70% of his time in underground bunkers micromanaging the war, highly vigilant about coups or Ukrainian drone assassination operations; the remaining 30% of his time is used for other government affairs, including managing the economy. This former official describes that the regime has stopped selling any narrative of "national revival" or "modernization" to the domestic public, leaving only repression, censorship, and control. The government is forcefully blocking the internet, trying to hide casualty figures and economic hardships, but this has triggered strong backlash from ordinary citizens. The original "implicit contract" of Russian society—that as long as you don't touch politics, you can enjoy a private life—has also ended. "People are asked to pledge loyalty, but no one tells them what kind of future this loyalty serves," the former official wrote. Nevertheless, this former official explicitly warns against excessive optimism: the state still firmly controls the repression machinery and the mechanisms of fear, and rebellion is not imminent. A linguistic break does not equal political action. His conclusion points directly to the systemic contradiction: "As long as Putin remains in power, this system can continue to function. But every action he takes to preserve and expand his power is accelerating the decay of the system itself." As the rules-based global order gradually fades, the space Russia once exploited by manipulating international institutions such as the UN Security Council is also shrinking. The decline of Western influence has further deprived Russia of its long-standing "imagined enemy," plunging it into an identity crisis. Every shackle Putin reinforces for self-preservation is causing Russia to pay a price that even he may not have fully calculated.